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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann., §78-2-2(3)(k). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court
transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this matter, upon transfer by the Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-2G).
CROSS-APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF
ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Cross-Appellants present the following issues for review upon the stated standards
of review:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Joseph Hughes ("Joe") and

Eva Margurita Cafferty ("Rikki") were entitled to any trustee fees and any
reimbursement of expenses where Joe and Rikki were unlawfully usurping the authority
of trustees under the Trust? Conclusions of law are reviewed under a "correctness"
standard. England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997). Interpretation of a trust
instrument is a question of law to determined under the "correctness" standard. Jeffs v.
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1251 (Utah 1998); Kline v. Utah Dep't of Health 776 P.2d 57
(UtahCt.App. 1989).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that payments from the Trust for

forensic accounting services and reports, should not be recaptured and assessed against
the distributive shares of Joe and Rikki under circumstances where the accounting was
required by Joe and Rikki's failure to provide an accounting as ordered by the court?
1

Findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. Rule 52(a) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in discounting the hourly rate for attorney's

fees incurred by Linnea Bennett ("Linnea")? The reasonableness of an award of fees is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah
1998).
4.

Whether the court erred in failing to award John Hughes ("John") any

attorney's fees where John Hughes submitted evidence of substantial fees incurred and
the court awarded fees to Linnea Bennet who was similarily situated? Whether the trial
court's findings of fact are sufficient in awarding attorney fees or not awarding fees is a
question of law which is reviewed on appeal under a correctness standard. Rehn v. Rehn,
91A P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999).
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND PROVISIONS
Utah Code §75-7-101 et. seq., (specifically §§302, 303, 306, 401 and 403).
Copies of these statutes are attached to the Addendum hereto as Exhibit "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Cross-Appellants Dwight Hughes ("Dwight"), John, and Linnea appeal from the
Final Judgment dated September 21, 2000 (R. 2272) and the Memorandum Decision
dated January 25, 2000 (R. 1960) of the Honorable James R. Taylor. The action below
was commenced by Dwight who filed an Unlawful Detainer Complaint. (R.177, 187.)
Dwight testified that his only purpose in filing the action was to force his siblings Joe
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and Rikki to recognize that he and his other siblings, John and Linnea, were legally
appointed co-trustees with Joe and Rikki, and to obtain an accounting of the Trusts from
Joe and Rikki since they had not complied with the Order of Guardianship. (R. 2474, T.
1137.) Joe and Rikki counterclaimed and brought Linnea and John into the lawsuit.
Both John and Linnea were forced to hire counsel to represent their interests in this
action.
In the proceeding below, the court has entered a number of prior orders that are
pertinent to the Court's determination at trial: (1) on March 16, 1994, the Court entered
an Order of Guardianship and Conservatorship (Exhibit 12, a copy of this order is
attached in the addendum as Exhibit "C"); (2) on November 13, 1996, the Court entered
an Order Appointing Independent Accountant For Hughes Family Trust, pursuant to
which Paul N. Shields, CPA, of Neilsen, Elggren, Durkin & Co. ("NED") was appointed
to administer the day-to-day financial transactions of the Trust, and to conduct an
independent accounting of the Trust assets (R. 781, a copy of this order is attached in the
addendum as Exhibit "B"); (3) on March 13, 1998, the Court entered a Declaratory
Judgment, which among other things declared the 1974 Trust to be a valid and existing
trust, declared that all five children were co-trustees of the Trust, including both the
Family and Marital Trusts, ordered the trustees to act by majority vote, and retained
jurisdiction to resolve issues that could not be resolved by majority vote of the five
trustees (R. 1328, a copy of this order is attached to appellants' addendum as Exhibit
"A"); and (4) on April 22, 1999, the Court entered an Order finding that the Trust
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required equal division of the assets among the beneficiaries to the estate (the five parties
to this action), and left for trial the remaining issue of "whether any beneficiaries should
have their portion of the equal division offset for expenses owed to the estate." (R. 1584,
a copy of this order is attached to appellants' addendum as Exhibit "C").
By this appeal, Cross-Appellants request this Court to determine whether any
trustee fees should have been awarded to Rikki and Joe in light of their several breaches
of trust, whether the trial court should have charged Rikki and Joe's portion of the estate
for the cost of the court appointed accountant and for other expenses and attorney's fees,
and whether the court should have reduced the attorney's fees of Linnea's attorney and
denied attorney's fees to John.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this action and appeal are all the children of McClure ("Mac")
Hughes and his wife, Helen Hughes ("Helen"). On October 12, 1974, Mac and Helen
executed The McClure Hughes Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust Agreement (the
"1974 Trust", Exhibit 1). The 1974 Trust set up two separate trusts: the Family Trust
and the Marital Trust. Pursuant to Article XII of the 1974 Trust, Mac and Helen could
revoke or amend the Family Trust only until one of them died and thereafter it was
irrevocable. (Id.) The Marital Trust remained revocable during the life of the survivor.
On September 23, 1978, Helen died (R. 2473, T. 76.) thus making the Family
Trust irrevocable. On February 25, 1979, Mac married Leora (Thurman) Hughes
("Leora") (R. 2473, T. 76-77). On May 22, 1987, Mac and Leora executed an

4

Amendment and Restatement of the McClure Hughes Family Inter Vivos Revocable
Trust Agreement (the "1987 Amendment") (Exhibit 2). At that time, two of the children,
Joe and Rikki, took actual control over the two Trusts as Trustees. (R. 2474, T. 816, T.
1216.)
On March 18, 1993, Mac executed an Amendment to McClure Hughes Family
Inter Vivos Revocable Trust Agreement (the "1993 Amendment") (Exhibit 3). On the
same date, Mac and Leora executed the McClure Hughes 1993 Irrevocable Trust (the
"1993 Trust"). (Exhibit 4).
On or about the first week of April 1993, Joe and Rikki initiated an action in the
state of California to establish that Mac was then legally incompetent and to appoint Joe
as the conservator of Mac's estate and person (R.2474, T. 1235-39). Cross Appellant
Linnea Bennett ("Linnea") opposed the California action and on July 22, 1993 also filed
a Petition in the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, to appoint a
conservator for Mac and his estate. On March 16, 1994, Judge Lynn Davis of the Fourth
District Court entered an Order which, among other things, determined that Mac was
incapacitated and incompetent, appointed Leora as the guardian of his person and the
conservator of his estate, declared that the Fourth District Court had sole jurisdiction
over the matters of Mac's guardianship and conservatorship, declared the California
proceedings to be without jurisdiction and invalid, and ordered Joe and Rikki, as
Trustees of the Trusts to "prepare and provide a detailed accounting for the past three (3)
years beginning with January 1st of 1990 for both of the Trusts under their control and to
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provide copies of that accounting to each of the other family members by April 15,
1994." Judge Davis also ordered Joe and Rikki to ^prepare future accountings in
accordance with standard accounting procedures and to provide the same to all family
members" annually beginning in 1993 and no later than April 30th of each following
year, and bi-annually on August 31st of each year. ("Order of Guardianship") (Exhibit
12). A copy of the Order of Guardianship is attached hereto as Exhibit UC".
During the course of their unauthorized control of the Trust Estate, Joe and Rikki
paid themselves unauthorized and exorbitant trustee fees and in other ways took
advantage of the Trust for their own benefit. (R. 2474, T. 1248-68; R. 1935-39; Exhibits
5-9). On May 2, 1995, Mac died. On September 4, 1995, Leora died.
The action from which this appeal is taken was commenced by Cross Appellant
Dwight who filed an Unlawful Detainer Complaint in order to force Joe and Rikki to
recognize that he and his siblings, John and Linnea were legally appointed co-trustees
with Joe and Rikki, and to obtain an accounting of the Trusts from Joe and Rikki since
they had not complied with the Order of Guardianship (R. 177, 187). Joe and Rikki
counterclaimed and brought Linnea and John into the lawsuit.
In the action below, the court entered a number of prior orders that are pertinent to
the Court's determination at trial. A list of these orders is set forth in the Statement of
the Case, supra at 3.
Pursuant to the Court's order, NED undertook and completed an accounting of the
Trust estate. The NED report was initially filed with the Court and all parties on March
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31, 1997, with numerous attachments (the "NED Report"). Subsequent addendums were
filed on August 20, 1997 (the "First Addendum"), October 30,1997 (the "Second
Addendum"), April 21, 1998 (The "Third Addendum"), and June 30, 1998 (the "Letter
Addendum"). (Exhibits 5-9.) For its services, NED was paid $85,956.79 through
September 1999 (R. 1939.) These costs would not have been incurred had Joe and Rikki
not taken unauthorized control over the Trust or if they had they provided the accounting
required by the Fourth District Court.
Based upon the NED Report and the addenda thereto and other evidence, Cross
Appellants contended that Joe and Rikki had illegally usurped powers of the Trust,
which were reserved to be exercised jointly with the Cross Appellants, and had
improperly applied funds of the Trust to their own benefits or to charges and expenses
not authorized by the Trust. A five day bench trial ensued, presided over by Judge James
Taylor. On January 25, 2000, Judge Taylor issued a Memorandum Decision, making
detailedfindingsand conclusions regarding the authority of the parties to administer the
estate and the distribution of the estate, including adjustments and offsets to the parties'
distributive shares based upon the evidence, and ordering Joe and Rikki to pay certain
attorney's fees incurred by the parties. (R. 1960.)
Following issuance of the trial Court's Memorandum Decision, Cross Appellant
John Hughesfileda motion to amend the January 25, 2000 Memorandum Decision by
including an award of attorney's fees to him. (R. 2261.) On June 26, 2000, the trial Court
issued a Memorandum Decision denying John's request for attorney's fees. (R. 2265).
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On September 21, 2000, the Court entered Judgment, adopting its prior
Memorandum Decisions and distributing the Trust Estate. (R. 2272.)
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Cross-Appellants first respond to the arguments of Rikki and Joe's appeal in
sections I-V below. In sections VI-IX, Cross-Appellants set forth the arguments in
support of their cross-appeal.
Rikki and Joe claim that the trial court erred in five areas. First, they claim that
the trial court erroneously denied an alleged motion for judgment on the pleadings.
However, no motion, written or oral was ever made at any time. After the trial in this
matter began, counsel for Rikki and Joe argued that the court should simply divide the
Trust in five equal portions as Judge Harding had previously ordered. The court
reminded counsel that Judge Harding had ordered a hearing to equally divide the Trust
subject to any offsets for expenses improperly taken from the Trust and declined to
simply divide the Trust equally without first considering offsets. Rikki and Joe's claim is
without merit because no motion, written or oral, was ever submitted. Rather, Rikki and
Joe asked Judge Taylor to ignore a previous ruling but the trial court declined to depart
from the previous ruling of the court. Furthermore, if Joe's and Rikki's oral request
constituted a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it was untimely as such motions
must be made before trial.
Second, Rikki and Joe claim that the trial court improperly awarded trial fees to
Linnea because she did not "prevail." This claim is also without merit because the
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evidence clearly shows-in fact Rikki and Joe admit-that Linnea recovered a benefit of
over $60,000 for the estate that was improperly taken by Rikki and Joe. Therefore, the
court properly awarded Linnea attorney's fees. Rikki and Joe also argue that the court
should have denied fees because Linnea acted improperly, and further that the evidence
did not support an award. However, the evidence shows no improper conduct by Linnea,
but is replete with improper, bad faith, oppressive, and illegal acts by Rikki and Joe that
support the court's award of attorney's fees to Linnea.
Third, Rikki and Joe argue that the trial court improperly reduced their trustee's
fees. This claim fails for two reasons. First, the evidence showed that Rikki and Joe's
actions as trustees were illegal, against the express purposes and intent of the Trusts, and
constituted serious breaches of their duties. Therefore, the trial court was justified in
denying all trustee's fees even though it awarded some fees. Second, Rikki and Joe
failed to show any credible evidence of what an appropriate trustee's fee should be and
the trial court properly set trustee's fees according to an agreement between the trustor
and trustees that specified the amount of fees to be paid the trustees.
Fourth, Rikki and Joe argue that the trial court improperly denied trustee's fees
and attorney's fees expended on an improper and altogether wasteful attempt to be
appointed as conservators for their father by a California court. This attempt was
rendered null and void by a Utah court. The entire conservatorship proceeding was a
deceitful attempt to force their father's second wife to return moneys that her husband
wanted her to have. Furthermore, their acts were undertaken in gross violation of their
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duties as trustees. For these reasons the trial court recaptured the amounts spent on the
California conservatorship proceeding.
Fifth, Rikki and Joe claim that the trial court improperly excluded evidence about
their siblings abilities to serve as trustees. This issue was decided by the trial court in a
previous final order which Rikki and Joe did not appeal. Therefore, this claim is not
properly before this Court.
Cross-Appellants claim the trial court erred in four areas. First, due to the their
numerous breaches of duty, Rikki and Joe's trustee's fees should not only have been
reduced, but should have been denied in their entirety.
Second, the trial court should have recaptured over $80,000 in accountant fees
that were incurred because Rikki and Joe failed to keep and make proper accountings of
the Trust to the beneficiaries. The trial court did not recapture the accounting fees
because it felt the NED accounting was helpful to its resolution of the case. Although
this is undeniably true, the case would never have required such an accounting absent
Rikki and Joe's failure to properly account to the other Trust beneficiaries.
Third, although the trial court granted Linnea's attorney's fees, it reduced the
hourly rate charged by her attorney. The rate was supported by evidence, and not
objected to by any party. Nevertheless, the trial court felt that the fees were slightly
excessive.
Fourth, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to John, but then failed to allow any
fees because John's attorney did not initially provide proper support for his fees. A
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detailed amended affidavit of fees was submitted, but the court felt it could not go back
and properly assess the efficacy and value of the work done by John's attorney.
ARGUMENT
I.

RIKKI AND JOE DID NOT MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY CONSIDERED OFFSETS BEFORE DISTRIBUTING THE
ESTATE.
Rikki and Joe claim that the trial court should have immediately ordered a

distribution of the estate in equal shares at the hearing commenced on September 24,
1999 because at that time they allege that they moved the trial court, "[i]n essence," for a
judgment on the pleadings. (Appellant's Brief, 14-15.)
Rikki and Joe's claim is without merit because a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is made "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay
the trial

" U.R.C.P., Rule 12(c). Clearly, in order to not delay a trial, the rule implies

an application before a hearing or a trial. This implication is expressly stated in
subsection (d): "[Judgment on the pleadings] shall be heard and determined before trial
on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination
thereof be deferred until the trial." U.R.C.P., Rule 12(d)(emphasis added).
Rikki and Joe made no written or oral motion for judgment on the pleadings. At
best, they asked the Court to infer a motion from their attorney's statement during the
hearing that he "would like the Court to enter a ruling that says we're going to have an
equal distribution." (R. 2473, T. 27.) Even if such a statement meets the particularity
requirements for motions as required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(b)(1)
11

(requiring a movant to "state with particularity the grounds therefor") it certainly does
not meet the requirements of Rule 12(c). Rule 12(c), explicitly and by its very nature,
requires a motion to be made well in advance of a trial of the matter upon which
judgment is sought. Rikki and Joe's alleged motion occurred during the trial. As such,
even if the motion had been made, it was not timely.
In reality, Joe and Rikki did not make a motion for judgment on the pleadings at
all. Rather, after the hearing began, counsel argued that because there were no pending
motions, there was nothing to have a hearing about, and therefore the trial court should
order an equal distribution of the estate in accordance with Judge Harding's previous
ruling of April 22, 1999. (R. 2473, T. 25-26.) Therefore, Rikki and Joe's claim of a
judgment on the pleadings on appeal does not square with their argument at the hearing.
What they wanted, and what they argued at the hearing, was a judgment based, not
on the pleadings, but on one part of Judge Harding's ruling. They wanted to distribute
equally without offsetting for expenses owed to the estate. However, Judge Harding had
ruled that a hearing would be held to determine "whether any beneficiaries should have
their portion of the equal division offset for expenses owed to the estate." (R. 1584
(emphasis added).)
The trial court refused to modify Judge Harding's previous order and said that the
purpose of the September, 1999, hearing was to determine distribution subject to offsets
according to the court's previous order of April 22, 1999:
. . . [M]y view is that Judge Harding's previous order reserved for this
hearing the issue of whether there should be any offsets or adjustments to
12

the base even distribution of Trust assets among the five beneficiaries and
that this is the time and the place for the parties to raise those claims of
offsets or distributions or, or claims.
(R. 2473, T. 35.)
Rikki and Joe's claim of an implied motion for judgment on the pleadings
appears to be an effort to have this Court apply a "correctness" standard to what is
essentially a "clearly erroneous" issue; whether the trial court correctly divided the estate.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED FEES TO LINNEA
BENNETT.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Awarded Attorney Fees Because Linnea
Bennett Obtained a Recovery for the Other Beneficiaries.

Rikki and Joe argue that the trial court improperly awarded Linnea attorney fees
because a party must prevail in order to receive attorney's fees for obtaining a recovery
for trust beneficiaries, and she was not a prevailing party. (Appellants' Brief, 16.) This
argument misinterprets the law regarding awards of attorney's fees to beneficiaries who
obtain recovery for other beneficiaries.
A court may award attorney fees to a beneficiary who obtains a recovery for other
beneficiaries wronged by a trustee without determining whether the recovering
beneficiary "prevailed." In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759
(Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court stated the general rule that "subject to certain
exceptions" attorney's fees are only awarded to prevailing parties where fees are
authorized by statute or contract. Id. at 782 citing In re Estate ofMcCart, 847 P.2d 184,
187 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Robinson v. Kirbie, 793 P.2d 315, 319 (Okla. Ct. App.

13

1990); Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research v. Holman, 732 P.2d 974, 987 (Wash. 1987).
One of the exceptions to the general rule noted by the Court is where "a beneficiary sues
a trustee for violation of the trust and obtains a recovery for all other beneficiaries whose
rights were also violated by the trustee." Id. at 783.
In such a case, the analysis is not whether a party obtaining a recovery prevails,
but whether that party obtains a recovery. The cases cited by the Stewart Court
uniformly apply such an analysis to attorney's fees awarded to a beneficiary that obtains
a recovery. In Robinson, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees to
beneficiaries whose actions "served to protect the entire trust res from improper
depletion by [the defendant]. Robinson, 793 P.2d at 319. The court did not require a
"prevailing parly" analysis. Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court in Holman, stated
that the test for awarding fees in a trust case is "whether the litigation and the
participation of the party seeking attorney fees caused a benefit to the trust. Holman, 732
P.2d at 987. The party seeking attorney fees in both cases did not have to "prevail;" the
party only had to obtain a benefit for the trust.
By attempting to impose a prevailing party analysis to the present case, Rikki and
Joe ignore the difference between an award of attorney's fees in a contractual setting, and
an award of attorney's fees in an equitable setting. Utah courts have expressly
distinguished the basis for an award of attorney's fees when awarded by contract
(generally, attorney's fees must be awarded to the prevailing party) and when they are
awarded as in matters of equity (the court has considerable discretion to award attorney's
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fees when fashioning equitable remedies). Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 809-10
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). Prevailing party analysis is simply inapplicable to an award of
fees to a beneficiary who recovers for the trust.
As in Robinson and Holman, it is undisputed that Linnea obtained a benefit for
the Trust. Rikki and Joe's own chart in their Brief shows that Linnea obtained a benefit
of $66,312.71 for the Trust. (Appellants' Brief, 16-17.) Rikki and Joe admit that
"Linnea asserted over $280,000 in claims and received a benefit of $66312.77. {Id. at
17 (emphasis added).) Under the analyses of Robinson and Holman, as adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court, and under the rule set forth in Saunders, Linnea is entitled to an
award of fees because she obtained a benefit for the Trust and the other beneficiaries
whose rights had been violated. Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its equitable
powers, analyzed the facts, and awarded attorney's fees. (R. 1955-36.)
Even if it were necessary to be a "prevailing party" to obtain attorney's fees in a
trust situation, Linnea clearly qualifies as a prevailing party because she received a net
recovery in her favor and the trial court determined that Rikki and Joe were the most
culpable parties. As held by the court in Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App.
1992) (cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in First Southwestern Financial
Services v. Sessions, 875 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah 1994)), even where a party prevails on
only a portion of their claim, they are still the prevailing party:
According to Brown, he "defeated" Richards on 90% of his fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty claims because Richards only received 10% of his
claimed damages. Such reasoning ignores the inescapable fact that while
Richards may not have prevailed to the full extent he felt entitled, he
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nevertheless prevailed. It is the determination of culpability, not the amount
of damages, that determines who is the prevailing party.
Id. at 155. Therefore, under any possible analysis, Linnea was properly awarded
attorney's fees.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Awarding
Attorney's Fees to Linnea.

Rikki and Joe claim that Linnea is further not entitled to attorney's fees because
she was guilty of "her own serious breach of trust as a trustee ...." (Appellants' Brief,
20.) They argue that this conduct made it "unjust and inequitable" for the court to award
her attorney's fees. This argument is based on actions taken by Dwight and John, which
were unopposed by Linnea, to undo the illegal depletion of Trust assets and illegal
usurpation of trust power by Rikki and Joe (R. 2473, T. 571-99). This argument is
without merit because none of the attempted acts were effected, and Dwight, John, and
Linnea never acted as trustees. In fact, Rikki and Joe admitted that Dwight and John
withdrew all their motions to assert control as trustees. (R. 2473, T. 19.) The three
siblings' attempt at redistributing Trust assets was simply an attempt to distribute the
Trust in a manner that would be fair to all five siblings and account for the improper
previous distributions to Rikki and Joe.
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court noted that "Dwight Hughes, John
Hughes and, to a certain extent, Linnea Bennett, have tried over and over again to act as
a majority of the children and to effect a distribution of the trust assets." (R. 1959.) The
trial court also acknowledged that such actions were in accordance with the Trust: "From
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the death of Helen Hughes and subsequent resignation of Robert Bennett, the five
children should have been co-trustees as to at least half of the trust funds." (R. 1937.)
The trial court found that the unjust and inequitable conduct was properly laid at the feet
of Rikki and Joe: "[Rikki and Joe] engaged in a persistent pattern aimed at remaining as
trustees without interference from their siblings." (Id.) The court further noted that
"[t]hey disregarded the plain language of the trust documents regarding the priority of
trustees." (Id.) Therefore, the trial court found inequity on the part of Rikki and Joe, not
Linnea. There was nothing unjust or inequitable about awarding Linnea her attorney's
fees.
C.

The Fact that Linnea Did Not Obtain a Recovery for Rikki and Joe
Does Not Preclude an Award of Attorney's Fees.

Rikki and Joe next advance the argument that because Linnea did not obtain a
benefit for Rikki and Joe, she did not obtain a recovery for "all" of the beneficiaries, and,
therefore, is not entitled to attorney's fees under Stewart. However, Stewart does not
require Linnea to obtain a benefit for Rikki and Joe. It only requires her to obtain a
benefit for "all other beneficiaries whose rights were also violated by the trust." Stewart,
885 P.2d at 783 (emphasis added). It is clear from the trial court's ruling that Rikki and
Joe's rights were not violated, rather they violated the rights of the other siblings. (R.
1936-37.) Stewart requires no recovery of benefits for Rikki and Joe as a condition to an
award of fees.
D.

The Trial Court Properly Awarded Attorney's Fees Because Linnea
Obtained a Recovery of Funds Improperly Taken by Rikki and Joe.

Rikki and Joe also claim that Linnea's recovery of benefits for the beneficiaries
whose rights were violated is unrelated to their own improper conduct and, therefore,
cannot lead to an award of attorney's fees under Stewart. (Appellants' Brief, 20-21.)
This claim is erroneous because Linnea's recovery is.related to wrongdoing by Rikki and
Joe—just not necessarily the examples of wrongdoing that Rikki and Joe cite in their
Brief. For example, the trial court found that Rikki and Joe improperly took excessive
trustee fees. (R. 1945-47.) The court also found that they improperly paid attorney's
fees from the Trust in an improper and unsuccessful attempt to appoint a conservator for
McClure Hughes in California. (R. 1942-44.) These amounts were recovered to the
estate by Linnea. Therefore, Linnea's recovery is based on wrongful conduct by Rikki
and Joe that violated the rights of the other beneficiaries.
Furthermore, in exercise of its equitable power, the court can award attorney's
fees where a party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782. In such a case, a court can award attorney's fees without
regard to any recovery. In this case, the wrongful conduct of Rikki and Joe during the
court's jurisdiction over the Trust, constituted oppressive and bad faith conduct by Rikki
and Joe. The trial court cited Rikki and Joe's flagrant disregard of the court's order to
provide an accounting to the other siblings as an example of their oppressive conduct.
(R. 1937.) It further cited Joe's threat to waste the Trust estates on litigation if the
siblings tried to assert their rights to act as trustees. (R. 1944.) Even if Linnea had not
obtained a recovery for the Trust, the actions of Rikki and Joe were in bad faith,
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vexatious, wanton and oppressive. Such actions further warranted an award of attorney's
fees to Linnea.
E.

The Trial Court's Findings Support Its Award of Attorney's Fees.

Finally, Rikki and Joe claim that the trial court's findings of fact in support of
attorney's fees were erroneous. (Appellants' Brief, 23.) For the same reasons set forth in
the previous section, this argument is also without merit. As Rikki and Joe admit in their
Brief, Linnea obtained a recovery for the Trust from amounts improperly taken by Rikki
and Joe when they acted illegally as trustees. She is therefore entitled to attorney's fees.
Rikki and Joe challenged certain facts adopted by the trial court in support of its
award of fees as being unsupported by the evidence. On the contrary, each of these facts
find ample support in the evidence. However, even if the evidence did not support the
trial court's findings, that would be no basis for reversing the award. Because those
facts, while relevant to, and supportive of, the trial court's award, are not necessary for
that award. The trial court's award of fees is fully supported solely by the fact that
Linnea recovered funds to the beneficiaries whose rights were violated.
Nevertheless, each of the facts challenged by Appellants will be briefly addressed.
With respect to their first claim that the five children were not trustees of the family Trust
after Bob Bennett resigned, that issue was resolved by the trial court in its March 13,
1998 Declaratory Judgment. (R. 1326.) The court affirmed the validity of the 1974
family Trust and stated that the five siblings were joint trustees that should act upon
majority vote. (R. 1325.) The court's declaratory judgment was a final appealable order
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of the court and because it was not timely appealed, Rikki and Joe cannot now claim the
determination of joint trusteeship among the five siblings was erroneous.
In estate matters, "a 'final order' is not necessarily dependent in all instances upon
whether all issues in a law suit have been adjudicated. The test to be applied is a
pragmatic test/' In re Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah App. 1997). In Morrison,
the trial court held that an order requiring the return of certain property to the estate was
improper and the heirs immediately appealed that order. This Court found that although
the estate litigation continued, that order was a final, appealable order because it resolved
an "issue of vital importance" and removed a "cloud of uncertainty" that would
otherwise hinder the resolution of the estate. Id. at 1017. In making its determination,
this Court cited three other Utah estate cases where an order was deemed final even
though the estate litigation continued. Id.
One of those cases, In re Voorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961) is
particularly applicable to the present case. In Voorhees, the Utah Supreme Court "held
that an order compelling a decedent's widow to transfer land to the estate was final
although the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction over other estate matters."
Morrison, 933 P.2d at 1017 citing Voorhees, 366 P.2d at 980. The basis for the Supreme
Court's decision was the fact that the trial court's order "decided 'the real issue' in the
case and 'did not leave open for reconsideration the question as to who owned the
property.'" Id. Therefore, "[t]here was nothing further to be decided on that particular
issue.'" Id.
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Morrison and Voohees are on all fours with the present case. Here, as in those
cases, an order concerning the estate was made by a court that continued to assert
jurisdiction over other estate matters. Judge Maetani resolved every issue between the
parties in his 1998 order and did not leave open for reconsideration whether the Trust
was valid and who were to be the trustees: "The trustees of the Trust, including, but not
limited to the marital portion and the family trust portion are the [five] surviving children
of McClure Hughes and Helen Hughes

" (R. 1323.) The order left no doubt that the

issue of who should have been trustees under the Trust was not open for reconsideration.
(R. 2472, T. 27, 31-32, 39.) Because that issue was decided with finality in 1998, and
no timely appeal was made, Rikki and Joe cannot now raise that issue on appeal. The
court correctly ruled that it was the law of the case. (R. 353-368.)
However, even if they could still appeal issues decided by Judge Maetani's
declaratory judgment, the appeal must fail because Judge Maetani's ruling was correct.
Joe and Rikki had no authority to act as trustees of the family Trust, and only had
temporary authority to act as trustees of the Marital Trust. Article VII of the 1974 Trust
(Exhibit 1) provides for the appointment of trustees and successors. It applies to both the
Family and the Marital Trust and provides that trustees shall be appointed in the
following priorities:
1.

[Mac and Helen] together.

2.

The survivor of [Mac and Helen] and Robert Clifford
Bennett, son-in-law of [Mac and Helen], and with
Joseph McClure Hughes, son of [Mac and Helen],
jointly, acting by majority vote.
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3.

All of the children of [Mac and Helen], jointly, or the
survivors or survivor, acting by majority vote.

4.

A Trustee chosen by a majority of the beneficiaries
with a parent or legal guardian voting for minor
beneficiaries.

Mac and Helen were the first trustees. When Helen died on September 23, 1978,
the first priority expired and the second priority came into being. The evidence showed
that Mac was aware of this and took somewhat belated steps to notify the next category
of trustees. Robert ("Bob") Bennett, husband of Linnea, testified that in October 1979,
Mac called him and told him that since he was a trustee he needed to sign a document.
Mac went to the Bennett's home in St. Louis and delivered Exhibit 23 for his signature,
which Bob signed on October 11, 1979. (R. 2473, T. 484-92). Exhibit 23 is an Affidavit
that confirms "by virtue of the death of Helen Hughes" the "following people will act as
Trustees in the following priority." Then the categories of priority listed above were
restated verbatim from the 1974 Trust. Therefore, the second category of priorities came
into being: Mac, Bob and Joe, to act jointly by majority vote. Mac, Bob and Joe each
signed the Affidavit.
On the very next day, Mac asked Bob to sign Exhibit 25, a Trustee Resignation,
which Bob signed on October 12, 1979. (Id.) Exhibit 25 not only confirms Bob's
resignation, but purports to "delegate and assign to McClure Hughes and Joseph
McClure Hughes and Eva Marguerite Cafferty" the rights and duties of successor
Trustees." This document is legally ineffective to delegate Bob's rights and duties as
Trustee and is legally invalid as an attempt to appoint trustees outside the clear provision
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of the 1974 Trust. As noted above, the second priority included Mac and Bob to act with
Joe by majority vote. The clear interpretation of that provision is that if either Mac or
Bob cease to serve the priority is extinguished and the next priority comes into being.
Moreover, the 1974 Trust (Exhibit 1) provides that a trustee may resign or decHne
to act by submitting a written resignation to the beneficiaries. (Article VIII B). And
under the Trust a Trustee may delegate his powers or duties to "one or more of the
remaining Trustees" (Article VII C); however, no provision is made for delegation of
Trustee duties and rights to a non trustee. This is in accord with Utah law. Utah Code
Ann. § 75-7-403 provides that "[t]he trustee shall not transfer his office to another..."
Therefore, the attempted delegation by Bob Bennett in Exhibit 25 was illegal and
completely invalid. It is obvious from the attempt to delegate that Mac realized the
second priority had to remain intact or be extinguished. Mac mistakenly believed that a
delegation of Bob's rights and duties to Rikki would keep the priority intact. In fact, it
had the legal effect of extinguishing the second priority.
Joe and Rikki both testified that Mac excluded them from the day to day
management of the Trusts at the time Exhibit 25 was executed, and were not so included
until October 1987, after the execution of the 1987 Amendment. (R. 2474, T. 808-15;
1215-17). However, Rikki mistakenly understood that she became a priority 2 trustee
when Bob Bennett resigned. (R. 2474, T. 809). As a result, Mac violated the terms of
the 1974 Trust in his day to day management of the same by turning over trustee
responsibilities to the third priority of trustees. Therefore, even if the Court were to
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consider that the attempt to delegate responsibility to Rikki were valid and had the effect
of maintaining the second priority, Mac violated the Trust by precluding the joint
exercise of trustee powers by majority vote. Exercise of trustee duties and privileges was
illegal from October 12, 1979 forward.
The Trust continued under Mac's sole (and illegal) administration until May 22,
1987, when Mac went to Doug Morrison's office and executed the 1987 Amendment
(Exhibit 2). By this time (May 1987), the Family Trust had become irrevocable by
Helen's death. Notwithstanding, it appears that the 1987 Amendment illegally purported
to modify the Family Trust. Article VI, §6.01(a) attempts to modify the trustee provision
by declaring Joe and Rikki as the only trustees, to act unanimously. It also provides in
§6.01(c) that after Mac's death any trustee may be removed and any successor trustee
shall be appointed by the majority vote of Mac's children. Obviously, this amendment
was invalid.
The 1987 Amendment also modified the Marital Trust, which was then still
subject to modification by Mac, by making the same changes to the trustee provision as
set forth above. 1987 Amendment, §6.02. Any trustee could resign by notifying Mac in
writing or each of the beneficiaries in writing. §6.06. Mac also amended the Marital
Trust by requiring trustees of the same to render w'at least annually an account of income
and principal (monthly during the lifetime of either [Mac or Leora]), including a
statement of all receipts, disbursements and capital charges, to all beneficiaries then
eligible to receive income...." §6.07. Significantly, the 1987 Amendment also
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modified the Marital Trust by providing that "for all purposes of this trust, McClure
Hughes shall be deemed competent unless determined not to be competent by a court
having jurisdiction over such matters." §4.01(c).
Mac also provided for Leora in the 1987 Amendment, if she outlived him. All of
the income of the Marital Trust was to go to Leora in monthly installments for as long as
she lived (§4.02(a)); all of the principal of the Marital Trust to the extent necessary to
maintain her standard of living was to go to Leora (§4.02(b)); Leora was to have the right
to live in Mac's residence for as long as she desired (§4.02(c)); and Leora could
withdraw the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the market value of the principal in the Marital
Trust annually (§4.02(d)).
As a matter of law, the 1987 Amendment was invalid as an attempt to modify the
Family Trust provisions of the 1974 Trust. It did, however, effectively modify the
provisions pertaining to the Marital Trust, including those set forth above. The result of
this amendment as it pertained to the authority of the parties herein was as follows: (a) it
had no effect on the Family Trust; the third priority had either come into being at the time
of Bob Bennett's resignation and all five of the children were co-trustees, or Bob
Bennett's resignation was a nullity having not been served on the beneficiaries, and (b)
with respect to the Marital Trust, the trustees were now Joe and Rikki, who had
obligations to provide monthly and annual accountings to all beneficiaries and who were
subject to removal by the majority vote of the beneficiaries following Mac's death.
It appears from the testimony that Joe and Rikki were given copies of the 1987
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Amendment at about the time it was executed but none of the other beneficiaries were
notified until later. (R. 2473, T. 264; 438-40; 571-72; 1220-68). In fact, it was only
after their receipt of the 1987 Amendment that Joe and Rikki began to actively
administer the Trusts. Their administration of the Marital Trust was initially a legal
exercise of power; however, as the record shows, they breached the contractual and
statutory duties of their positions and, following Mac's death, they illegally retained
office after having been lawfully removed by the majority vote of the beneficiaries. (R.
2473, T. 264-77; 438-62; 571-98; 820-57). Joe and Rikki's assumption of trustee duties
and privileges over the Family Trust was an illegal usurpation of power without authority
from the beginning.
On March 18, 1993, Mac executed an Amendment to McClure Hughes Family
InterVivos Revocable Trust (the "1993 Amendment") (Exhibit 3) (repeated in Exhibits
30 and 213) which once again modified the Marital Trust and attempted to illegally
modify the Family Trust. Keep in mind that at this time, the trustees of the Family Trust
were the five siblings. Since any attempt to modify the Family Trust after Helen's death
was not permitted by the terms of the 1974 Trust, that portion of the 1993 Amendment
which purported to amend the Family Trust was a nullity.
However, the 1993 Amendment legally modified the Marital Trust in the
following pertinent particulars: (a) the trustees were changed to Joe, Rikki and John, and
such trustees were required to act unanimously, (b) the co-trustees were required to
prepare a complete annual accounting on a calendar year basis and deliver the same to
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Mac, Leora and each of the children on or before the due date of the federal income tax
return for each Trust, (c) if Mac were to be determined incompetent or were to die, the
co-trustees were to follow the written instructions of Leora as to the assets of the Marital
Trust and advise her immediately in writing of all their decisions. (Exhibit 3).
The 1993 Amendment also informed the co-trustees (Joe, Rikki and John) that
Mac and Leora had created and executed the McClure Hughes 1993 Irrevocable Trust
(the "1993 Trust"). The 1993 Trust created a trust for the benefit of Mac and Leora for
the sole purpose of depositing the funds and investments held by Mac and Leora which
had been taken as distributions from the Marital Trust. Mac and Leora named
themselves and John as trustees. The testimony establishes that sometime between 1987
and 1990, Mac and Leora withdrew approximately $100,000fromthe Marital Trust. (R.
2474, T. 874-75). Mac and Leora also had other accounts and funds that were separate
from the Trusts. The evidence strongly suggests that it was Mac and Leora's intention to
protect such funds from their children until after the last of them had died.
On March 26, 1993, Doug Morrison, Mac and Leora's attorney, sent copies of the
1993 Amendment and 1993 Trust to John, Rikki, Joe, Mac and Leora (Exhibit 30) (R.
1937). The copies to Rikki and Joe were accompanied by a memorandum explaining
Mac's intentions regarding the Marital Trust:
I was also requested to clarify with you that once the income from the
Marital Trust is distributed to the beneficiaries, it is no longer part of the
Marital Trust. Prior to the establishment of the Irrevocable Trust, it legally
belonged to your dad individually when he received it, and then to him and
Leora jointly after it went into their joint account.
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It is unrebutted that both Joe and Rikki were aware of Mac's intentions to keep the
money he and Leora had taken from Marital Trust and maintain it for his and Leora's
benefit, separate from the Trusts and the beneficiaries.
Rikki and Joe next claim that the court erroneously concluded that Rikki and Joe
were justified in opposing their siblings attempts to act as joint trustees. For the reasons
set forth in the immediately preceding argument, Rikki and Joe cannot raise this issue on
appeal. They failed to timely appeal Judge Maetani's Declaratory Judgment.
Furthermore, as set forth in the preceding argument, the trust language clearly sets forth
the priorities and the trial court and those priorities were reaffirmed by the court in its
Memorandum Decision. (R. 1953.)
Rikki and Joe also argue erroneously that they were justified in ignoring Doug
Morrison's legal interpretation of the Marital Trust. However, the trial court recognized
and affirmed the correctness of Mr. Morrison's interpretation. (R. 1937, 1943). Rikki
and Joe had no right to disregard the Marital Trust. The court properly awarded fees to
Linnea incurred in allowing this position.
Finally, Rikki and Joe argue that they provided regular accountings after the
Hedrick accounting was filed and the court should not have faulted them for failing to
provide accountings. This was not the case. First, Rikki and Joe failed to provide
accountings in violation of the Trust and Utah law for years before the court ordered an
accounting. They systematically and continuously denied Linnea, Dwight and John
access to the records of the Trust, and never provided an accounting of their dealings
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with the Trust assets, despite Trust provisions, statutory provisions and express court
orders requiring an accounting.
The record is replete with evidence that Joe and Rikki denied their siblings access
to records and never provided an accounting as required by the Trust documents and
amendments, by the law of the state of Utah, and by the Court's unambiguous order. (R.
2473, T. 264-77; 438-62; 571-98; 820-57). Section 6.07 of the 1987 Trust provides as
follows:
Accounting. With respect to each trust created herein, Trustee shall
render at least annually an account of income and principal (monthly
during the lifetime of either McClure Hughes or Leora T. Hughes),
including a statement of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to.
all beneficiaries then eligible to receive income or to the natural or legal
guardians of such beneficiaries.
(Emphasis added). Similarly, the 1993 Amendment clarified, reiterated and expanded
the foregoing duties of accounting:
Furthermore, the Trustor clarifies that a complete annual accounting shall
be prepared on a calendar year basis by the Co-Trustees and delivered to
the Trustor, the Trustor's wife, and to each of the Trustor's children on or
before the due date of the federal income tax return for each trust.
(Emphasis added).
The law of the state of Utah is clear in burdening any trustee with duties to render
and distribute accountings of the Trust assets, regardless of whether such duty is included
in the Trust document.
§75-7-303. Duty to inform and account to beneficiaries.
(2) Upon reasonable request, the trustee shall provide the beneficiary
with a copy of the terms of the trust which describe or affect his interest
and with relevant information about the assets of the trust and the
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particulars relating to the administration.
(3) Upon reasonable request, a beneficiary is entitled to a statement of the
accounts of the trust annually and on termination of the trust or change of
the trustee.
Finally, as noted above, on March 16, 1994, Judge Davis ordered Joe and Rikki to
"prepare and provide a detailed accounting for the past three (3) years beginning with
January 1st of 1990 for both of the trusts" and ordered that future accountings be
provided on an annual basis for 1993 and on a semi annual basis beginning in 1994.
(Exhibit 12). Despite all of these contractual and legal obligations, Joe and Rikki refused
to comply.

No accounting at all was provided to the beneficiaries until Mr. Hedrick's

delivery of an insufficient and incomplete compilation. (R.1937.) The first accounting
that met the requirements of the Trust, the statutes or the court order was provided by
NED after its appointment. The cost of that accounting was more than $80,000. The
NED accounting would not have been necessary if Joe and Rikki would have (1) abided
by the demands and notices of their siblings to recognize the other children as cotrustees, or (2) would have maintained and provided adequate accountings along the way.
However, they still did not provide an adequate accounting even after being ordered by
the court. (R. 1937.) The court correctly determined that Rikki and Joe had failed to
provide an accounting to the other beneficiaries.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED ANY TRUSTEE
FEES TO JOE AND RIKKI. HOWEVER, IF THAT DETERMINATION
IS AFFIRMED ON APPEAL, THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD SHOULD
ALSO BE AFFIRMED.
Linnea, Dwight and John contend that the trial court erred in its decision to award
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any trustee fees to Rikki and Joe. That argument is set forth at Section VI below.
However, if the Court were to affirm the trial court's determination of entitlement to
trustee fees, it should also reject Rikki and Joe's argument and affirm the trial court's
determination as to the amount of trustee fees, as argued herein. Rikki and Joe claim that
the trial court improperly reduced their trustee fees. (Appellants' Brief, 33-34.) This
claim is unfounded for two reasons: First, Rikki and Joe were acting illegally and, for the
reasons stated in Section VI below, the court should have awarded no fees. Second, the
court did not find their evidence of reasonable fees to be credible. Instead it found
credible evidence that Rikki, Joe, and McClure Hughes had agreed upon a reasonable
amount to be paid as trustee fees and used this evidence as the basis for determining a
reasonable fee. (R. 1946-48).
A trial court has wide discretion to award trustee fees that it finds are reasonable
based upon services actually performed and other attending circumstances. Edwards v.
Holleman, 893 S.W.2d 115, 118-19 (Tex. App. 1995) (determination of proper trustee's
fees may consider "tasks to be performed, the amount of time spent, and other attending
circumstances"). Although a percentage basis may be used "for its convenience; the
question is not one of percentage, but of compensation for 'responsibility incurred and
labor expended.'"//? re Sensenbrenner, 252 N.W.2d 47, 55-56 (Wis. 1977)
In this case, the 1974 Trust was silent as to trustee's fees and the 1987
Amendment provided that a "[t]rustee shall be entitled to a reasonable fee, which may be
waived wholly or partially, for trustees' services, commensurate with fees charged by
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trustees for similar services." (R. 1947.) The only evidence presented in the five day
trial as to what constituted a reasonable fee commensurate with fees charged by trustees
for similar services was hearsay testimony by Rikki that someone in the Mercantile Bank
in St. Louis had told her that they would charge one percent. (R. 650-51.) In reviewing
this evidence, the trial court found that the evidence presented by Rikki "consisted of
unsupported estimates made by persons not called as witnesses to this proceeding which
this Court does not find sufficiently reliable to form the basis for a calculation of
trustee's fees." (R. 1947.) The court did not find Joe's claim based on "a calculation of
hours spent and his comparative income as a podiatrist" helpful in determining
reasonable fees. (Id.) There was no evidence presented that a podiatrist's fee is
commensurate with that of a trustee. Throughout the entire trial there was simply no
reliable evidence presented of what a reasonable fee would be.
The absence of any evidence to support a claim for a reasonable fee is particularly
egregious in light of the fact that the judge had previously given Rikki and Joe a fair
warning on the second day of trial that the only evidence he had seen of a reasonable fee
was the agreement for trustee's fees that Joe and Rikki placed in front of Mac for his
signature. The judge advised them that if nothing was presented to the contrary, the
court would use that agreement to determine a reasonable trustee's fee. (R. 400.) The
court's reliance on a fee agreement written by Rikki and signed by Mac was proper since
it is evidence of what the settlor and trustees believed to be a reasonable fee. This is
certainly an "attending circumstance" that a court of equity can rely upon in determining
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a reasonable trustee's fee. Edwards, 893 S.W.2d at 118. Joe's claim that he cannot be
held to the fee schedule set forth in the agreement because the agreement was "between
Mac and Rikkf (Appellants' Brief, 37) does not square with Rikki's testimony that both
she and Joe agreed to abide by the agreement if Mac signed it. (R. 844.) Given Ricki
and Joe's failure to marshall any evidence to the contrary was presented, the agreement
was a reasonable basis for determining trustee's fees.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD JOE
EXTRAORDINARY FEES AND PROPERLY REQUIRED RIKKI AND
JOE TO REPAY ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED TO INSTITUTE AN
IMPROPER AND VOID CONSERVATORY PROCEEDING IN
CALIFORNIA.
Rikki and Joe claim that the court improperly charged them for a wasteful and

void proceeding to have Joe appointed as Mac's conservator. They claim the court
"[apparently .. believed that a trustee would only have a duty to protect trust assets if
the trust agreement expressly required that duty." (Appellants' Brief, 40.)
Actually, the trial court recognized a trustee's duty to protect Trust assets, but it
also recognized the impropriety of ignoring the express language of the 1993
Amendment to the Trust agreement that allowed Mac or his second wife, Leora, to
withdraw funds from the Marital Trust. (Exhibit 3, R. 2473, T. 588-89). Even though
the amendment allowed the withdrawal of funds, Joe started the conservatorship
proceeding in a wrongful attempt to avoid having Leora withdraw funds for her
maintenance as expressly allowed by the Trust. (R. 2474, T. 828-30; 1236-39). The
court correctly found that Joe's actions were a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to
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abide by the terms of the Trust agreement. (R. 1943.)
In addition to charging the Trust for their attorney's fees in the wasteful California
litigation, Joe charged the Trust so called "extraordinary fees" for trying to recover the
funds back to the Marital Trust, beyond the normal trustee's duties. As Joe testified in
defense of his charges: "[i]t was an extraordinary amount of work, extraordinary
circumstance." (R. 1196.) For such efforts, he charged the Trust at the $166 per hour rate
charged by podiatrists for medical care. (R. 1199, Exhibit 223). Between February and
December 1993, Joe charged the Trust $34,830.91 as extraordinary fees for (1) initiating
a deceptive and unsuccessful action in California to avoid compliance with Mac's 1993
Amendment and the 1993 Trust, and (2) opposing Linnea's successful effort in this court
to appoint Leora and herself conservators of Mac's estate. Joe's extraordinary charges
made good on a threat he had made to Linnea:
Q.

How did you respond individually?

A.
He told me that if I pusued, if I tried to stop him from being
conservator that he would see to it that I would not, it would cost me a lot
of money, I would end up losing my, my portion of the Trust as a, when I
became a beneficiary, and that he would take it to court and make sure that,
that all three of us would, would lose.
Q.
Did he say anything about threatening to take it to court nad have
the Trust pay his expenses?
A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

What did he say about that?

A.
He said that if we didn't stop trying to fight him in court, that he
would begin charging - he claim that he made - 1 forget how much he said
- how ever much he earned a day as a doctor, that he would charge that
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much for every time that he had to take off work to come to court, that he
would charge that amount...
Q.

Against the estate?

A.

Against the trust.

(R. 2473, T. 275-77). By order of the Fourth District Court entered on March 16, 1994,
Judge Davis nullified the California proceedings, dismissed Joe's conservatorship in that
state and appointed Leora as Mac's guardian and the conservator of his estate. Linnea
was appointed as co-conservator. (Exhibit 12). Dwight and John joined in the action.
The effect of the Utah ruling was to completely reverse the efforts of Joe and Rikki in
disregarding of the 1993 Amendment and 1993 Trust, and render the entire charade in
California a waste of time and Trust assets. Because of the wasteful and improper nature
of the California conservatorship proceedings, the trial court properly disallowed Joe's
extraordinary fees.
In addition, the court was justified in denying the fees because, as with the
trustee's fees, there was no evidentiary basis to suggest that Joe's fee for podiatrist work
was relevant to or commensurate for his work in the conservatorship proceeding. (R.
1196-2000.) The court characterized this testimony as "unpersuasive." (R. 1945.) In
addition, although the court did not rely upon it, the disparity between the attorney's fees
claimed for the conservatorship proceeding ($5,230) and Joe's fee's ($34,830.91) is a
further reason to find Joe's testimony unpersuasive. It suggests that he was overcharging
and acting in his own self-interest.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISALLOWED EVIDENCE
REGARDING RIKKI AND JOE'S OPINION ABOUT THEIR SIBLINGS
ABILITIES TO SERVE AS TRUSTEES.
Finally, Rikki and Joe claim that the court's refusal to hear matters that had been

adjudged by Judge Maetani two years earlier was error. (Appellants' Brief, 41.) For the
reasons set forth in section II E, above, this issue was not timely appealed and may not
now be raised. Moreover, Rikki and Joe had no legal authority to determine the
qualifications of other trustees. If they had concerns over another trustee's qualification
to serve, the proper resort would have been a petition for removal.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DENIED RIKKI AND JOE'S
TRUSTEE'S FEES IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
As stated above, Linnea, Dwight and John contend the court erred in awarding

any trustee fees to Rikki and Joe. A court may, in the proper exercise of its equitable
powers, deny trustee's fees in their entirety where a trustee has breached its fiduciary
duties. Sensenbrenner, 252 N.W.2d at 643 (court can properly deny all trustee
compensation where it finds a breach of fiduciary duty). In this case, the numerous
breaches, bad faith, and oppressive acts of Rikki and Joe require a complete denial of all
trustee's fees.
This case has been characterized by a history of repeated attempts by Linnea,
Dwight and John to assert their rightful and lawful positions as co-trustees under the
Family and Marital Trusts, which attempts have been rejected time and time again by Joe
and Rikki. At the time of Bob Bennett's resignation in October 1979, the second priority
of trustees under the 1974 Trust was extinguished and, at that time, the third priority
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consisting of all five children came into being. Thus, from that date forward, Linnea,
John and Dwight were entitled to be recognized as trustees of the Family Trust. The
Marital Trust was modified in March 1993 to make John a co-trustee with Joe and Rikki.
However, as noted above, they refused to recognize John's rightful status.
John was the first of the three siblings to demand that he be included as a trustee
in the administration of the Trust. Joe acknowledged in his testimony that John had
always wanted to be a trustee, even before the 1987 Amendment, but Joe and Rikki had
always denied his request. (R. 2474, T. 1221). After the 1993 Amendment, John again
demanded recognition as a trustee and was again refused. (R. 2474, T. 1223-26). At this
time, Joe and Rikki had no authority to serve as sole trustees under either Trust.
In January 1995, John made a written request to be included as a trustee (Exhibit
50) and was again refused by Joe and Rikki. After Mac died on May 2, 1995, the status
of the trustees under both the Family and Marital Trusts changed. Joe and Rikki cannot
contend that they were serving under the second priority of the 1974 Family Trust after
Mac's death. It is abundantly clear that Mac was a necessary constituent of the second
priority and no argument has been made nor could it be advanced that Mac "delegated"
his authority to Rikki or Joe. Only one conclusion is reasonable: the second priority
came to an end at the earliest when Bob Bennett resigned and at the latest when Mac
died. Thereafter, the third priority becomes effective, and all of the children, acting by
majority vote, are co-trustees. As noted above, the 1987 Amendment was null and void
as pertaining to the irrevocable Family Trust. It is interesting that had it been an effective
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modification of the Family Trust, it would have rendered the acting trustees subject to
removal and replacement by majority vote of the beneficiaries.
Upon Mac's death, the Marital Trust became irrevocable. As it had been amended
in 1987, the Marital Trust provided that trustees "may be removed and any successor
Trustee shall be appointed by the majority vote o f Mac's children. (Exhibit 2). As
amended in 1993, the Marital Trust provided that John, Joe and Rikki were co-trustees,
but left unmodified the provision allowing removal and substitution of trustees by the
majority vote of Mac's children.
All the parties testified that shortly after Mac's death they received a copy of the
1974 Trust and were able to read the trustee priorities section for the first time. They
also got access for the first time to the 1987 Amendment. It was then they learned that
Linnea and Dwight were trustees. John had previously learned he was a trustee of the
Marital Trust; however, he learned after Mac's death that he was also entitled to serve as
trustee of the Family Trust. Shortly after being informed of their status under the 1974
Trust and the 1987 Amendment, Linnea, Dwight and John took action.
On June 6, 1995, Linnea, Dwight and John signed an Affidavit of Trustee
Succession and delivered the same to Joe and Rikki. (Exhibit 13). The Affidavit recites
§6.02(c) of the 1987 Amendment regarding the right of a majority of Mac's children to
remove and appoint trustees. It then goes on to clearly and unequivocally remove Rikki
and Joe as trustees of the Trusts and appoint John, Joe, Rikki and Linnea as successor
trustees. The Affidavit was signed by Linnea, John and Dwight, comprising a majority
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of Mac's children. Joe and Rikki testified that they received Exhibit 13 and rejected it
without response. At this point, Joe and Rikki were acting contrary to law and in
complete derogation of the terms and provisions of a legally enforceable trust document.
Their continued retention of the books and records, and the funds and assets of the Trust
was illegal and without any reasonable justification.
Almost a year went by, with Linnea, John and Dwight making repeated and
unresponded to requests for accounting and for access to the trust records. Finally, in
desperation, Dwight commenced this action by the pro se filing of an Unlawful Detainer
action on May 8, 1996. (R. 177; 187). That apparently got the attention of Joe and
Rikki. On May 20, 1996, Joe and Rikki persuaded Linnea to sign a Notice of Removal
of Trustees and Appointment of New Trustees (Exhibit 16) with the intention of
reversing the effect of Exhibit 13. Linnea agreed to sign because she thought it would be
a workable compromise to have her and Rikki acting as the only co-trustees. Exhibit 16
removed all current trustees of the Trust and appointed Linnea and Rikki as new
successor co-trustees. In the view of Linnea Bennett, this constituted a valid and legal
action by a majority of the beneficiaries of the Trust to remove and appoint trustees.
Despite the fact that Joe and Rikki signed Exhibit 16, they apparently did not ever
intend to actually abide by it. The appointment of Linnea and Rikki was window
dressing intended to appease Linnea, Dwight and John and resolve the lawsuit. Joe and
Rikki did not include Linnea in any trustee or trust administration decisions and
continued to preclude her from having meaningful access to the records of the Trust. (R.
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2473, T. 268-76). Furthermore, Joe continued to act as a trustee despite his removal
pursuant to Exhibit 16. When it became apparent to Linnea that she was not permitted to
act as a trustee, she decided the only viable alternative was to join with Dwight and John
in signing Exhibit 17 on October 15, 1996.
Pursuant to Exhibit 17, a majority of the beneficiaries consisting of Linnea,
Dwight and John executed a Removal of Trustees and Appointment of Successor
Trustees, which effectively removed all current trustees (Linnea and Rikki) and
appointed as successors all five of the beneficiaries to act by majority vote. It is
noteworthy that despite Joe and Rikki's efforts to completely exclude Dwight, John and
Linnea, their three siblings were always interested in allowing the Trust to be
administered by the five children together, acting by a majority vote. Unfortunately, the
execution and delivery of Exhibit 17 had no effect on Joe and Rikki, who continued to
usurp authority over the Trust and its assets. Fearing that the notice contained in Exhibit
17 may have been deficient because it failed to recite the pertinent provisions of the 1978
Amendment that supported the action taken therein, on October 15, 1995, Linnea,
Dwight and John signed and delivered Exhibit 18. That exhibit reaffirmed the action
taken in Exhibit 17 and recited the pertinent provisions supporting the action. The action
of removal and appointment taken in Exhibit 17 and reaffirmed in Exhibit 18 was a legal
and valid exercise of authority granted by the Trust and restated in the 1978 Amendment.
Nevertheless, Joe and Rikki once again refused to turnover control of the Trust
and its assets and records to the appointed co-trustees. All of the efforts by Linnea,
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Dwight and John to take non-judicial action to enforce their rights as trustees had been to
no avail. Judicial action was the only remaining alternative. Since Joe and Rikki had
refused to comply with the earlier court order requiring an accounting, the court in this
action on November 13, 1996, entered its Order appointing NED to act as independent
accountant for the Trust to administer the day-to-day financial transactions of the Trust,
and to conduct an independent accounting of the Trust assets. Thereafter, on March 13,
1998, the Court entered the Declaratory Judgment, which among other things declared
the 1974 Trust to be a valid and existing trust, declared that all five children were cotrustees of the Trust, including both the Family and Marital Trusts, and ordering the
trustees to act by majority vote.
The Declaratory Judgment totally vindicated the position taken repeatedly by
Linnea, Dwight and John in their notices to Joe and Rikki. However, the damage was
largely done and the case since the entry of the Declaratory Judgment has been focused
on obtaining an accounting of the actions of Joe and Rikki during the lengthy period of
their illegal and unauthorized possession of the Trust assets. Given the illegality of their
actions, this Court should deny all trustee's fee to Rikki and Joe.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CHARGE THE ENTIRE
COSTS OF THE ORDERED NED ACCOUNTING AGAINST THE
SHARES OF RIKKI AND JOE SINCE THE NED ACCOUNTING WAS
NECESSITATED BY RIKKTS AND JOE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
PREVIOUS ACCOUNTINGS.
Where the acts of a trustee necessitate accounting expenses that could have been

avoided had the trustee performed requisite accountings, it is proper to surcharge the
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trustee with the additional cost of the accounting. In Murphy v. Central Bank and Trust
Co., 699 P.2d 13 (Colo. App. 1985), the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's surcharge for accounting costs to a trustee for its failure to supply required
accountings. Id. at 14-15. The court noted that the trustee's failure to supply the
beneficiaries proper accountings "made it necessary for them to hire an outside
accountant.... It was properly within the trial court's discretion to determine that this
charge was reasonable and surcharge the [trustee] for these'expenses incurred as a result
of its breach." Id.
Similarly, in this case, the failure of Rikki and Joe to provide regular accountings
(or any accountings) to the other beneficiaries as required by the several trusts, Utah law,
and court orders was the sole reason a forensic accounting was required in this case, at a
cost of $83,813.74. Their complete failure in this regard is set forth in detail above. But
for their breach of duty, this cost would have been avoided. Although there would have
been costs associated with supplying requisite periodic accountings, that would have
been a small fraction of the cost of the tremendous forensic accounting effort required in
this case. Furthermore, even though the court found that the fee was reasonable and
helpful to the court, (R. 1939) this does not change the fact that the accounting would
have been unnecessary but for Rikki and Joe's breach of duty. The NED accounting was
helpful to the court only because it was necessary in the absence of any other accounting.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISCOUNTED THE
HOURLY RATE CHARGED BY LINNEA'S ATTORNEY,
Although the trial court properly awarded Linnea's attorney's fees, it reduced Mr.
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Schmutz's hourly rate from $175 per hour to $150 per hour even though evidence was
submitted supporting the reasonableness of the hourly fee. (R. 1961-93.) More
significantly, although objections were made to the Affidavits of John Buckley and Craig
Carlile as to the reasonableness and support for their fees (R. 2013-16; 2051-54.), no
party objected to the reasonableness or the rate of Mr. Schmutz's fee. The court's basis
for reducing the fee was that it was "slightly excessive" in light of Mr. Buckley's rate of
$100 per hour. (R. 2172.) Mr. Schmutz's affidavit states that his rates are consistent with
those customarily charged by attorneys with similar experience and expertise in the same
vicinity and there was no evidence before the court to the contrary. Therefore, in
accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's seminal case of Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988), Mr. Schmutz properly supported his fees and should be
granted them in their entirety.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO AWARD
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO JOHN HUGHES.
The trial court properly determined that John was entitled to attorney's fees (R.

1936) for the same reason it awarded fees to Linnea. John assisted in obtaining a
recovery for the Trust and he was a victim of the bad faith and oppression of Rikki and
Joe during these proceedings. Nevertheless, the court denied all of the attorney fees
charged by Craig Carlile, John's attorney, resulting in no award to John. Judge Taylor
based his denial of fees on the difficulty of determining "the efficacy and importance of
his work" (R. 2171) because Judge Taylor was not the judge during the time Mr. Carlile
was involved in the trial. Furthermore, the court felt that Mr. Carlile's Affidavit was not
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sufficiently detailed to allow the court to make the findings necessary for an award of
attorney's fees. {Id.)
Although Mr. Carlile's initial Affidavit was somewhat cryptic, he submitted a
supplemental affidavit after the court's initial ruling on attorney's fees that set forth in
great detail his work and fees in connection with the case. (R. 2193-251.) The court
addressed the supplemental affidavit and recognized its greater detail but still declined to
grant fees because Mr. Carlile had withdrawn before trial for unknown reasons and the
court felt that his withdrawal may have negatively impacted the litigation. (R. 2264-65.)
The court's basis for denying Mr. Carlile's fees in their entirety, after he submitted
an affidavit copiously detailing his fees, was improper because his amended affidavit
complied with all of the bases for supporting attorneys fees as set forth in Dixie State
Bank. See Id. at 990.
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons set forth herein, Cross-Appellants respectfully request this Court
to affirm the trial court's Final Judgment with respect to all claims made by the
Appellants and to reverse the trial court's denial of accounting fees for the NED
accounting and to remand this case for determination of proper amounts to be charged
against Rikki and Joe for their breach of duties as trustees, the NED accounting, and
Linnea and John's attorney's fees.
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<£
Schmutz
Ice N. Long

45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

"4h
I certify that on the ^

— day of September, 2001,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing brief to be served by hand-delivering the same to the following:
Charles M. Bennett
Kristy L. Bertelsen
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
77 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

46

ADDENDUM

Tab A

PART 3
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES
75-7-302. Trustee's standard of care and performance.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2), a trustee who invests
and manages trust assets owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to comply
with the prudent investor rule as set forth in this section. If a trustee is named
on the basis of a trustees representations of special skills or expertise, the
trustee has a duty to use those special skills or expertise.
(2) The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded, restricted,
eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust. A trustee is not
liable to a beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in reasonable
reliance on the provisions of the trust.
(3) A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor
would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and

75-7-302

UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

96

other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall
exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.
(4) A trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual
assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust
portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk
and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust. Among circumstances
that the trustee shall consider in investing and managing trust assets are such
of the following as are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries:
(a) general economic conditions;
(b) the possible effect of inflation or deflation:
(c) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies:
(d) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the
overall trust portfolio, which may include financial assets, interests in
closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and
real property;
(e) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of
capital;
(f) other resources of the beneficiaries;
(g) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital;
(h) the duty to incur only reasonable and appropriate investment costs;
and
(i) an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes
of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.
(5) A trustee shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the
investment and management of trust assets.
(6) A trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of investment
consistent with the standards of this section.
(7) A trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless, the trustee
reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of
:he trust are better served without diversifying.
(8) (a) A trustee shall invest and manage the trust assets solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries.
(b) If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act
impartially in investing and managing the trust assets, taking into
account any differing interests of the beneficiaries.
(9) This section does not require a specific outcome in investing, and
ompliance with the prudent investor rule is determined in light of the facts
ind circumstances existing at the time of a trustee's decision or action and not
•y hindsight.
(10) Within a reasonable time after accepting a trusteeship or receiving
rust assets, a trustee shall review the trust assets and make and implement
ecisions concerning the retention and disposition of assets, in order to bring
tie trust portfolio into compliance with the purposes, terms, distribution
^quirements, and other circumstances of the trust, and with the requirements
f this section.
(11) (a) A trustee may delegate investment and management functions that
a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the
circumstances. The trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and
caution in:
(i) selecting the agent;
(ii; establishing the scope and terms of the delegation consistent
with the purposes of the trust; and
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PART 3
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES
75-7-301.

General duties not limited.

Except as specifically provided, the general duty of the trustee to administer a trust expeditiously for the benefit of the beneficiaries is not altered by
this code.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-301. enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8.

Cross-References. — Uniform trustees'
powers provisions, § 75-7-401 et seq

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 76 Am Jur 2d Trusts $321
et seq
C.J.S. — 90 C J S Trusts § 246 et seq
A.L.R. — Liability of trustee for payments

or conveyances under a trust subsequently
held to be invalid, 77 A.L.R4th 1177.
Key Numbers. — Trusts «=> 171 et seq.

75-7-302. Trustee's standard of care and performance.
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee shall
observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that would be observed
by a prudent man dealing with the property of another, and if the trustee has
special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representations of special
skills or expertise, he is under a duty to use those skills.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-302, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8.
Editorial Board Comment — This is a
new general provision designed to make clear
the standard of skill expected from trustees
both individual and corporate, nonprofessional
and professional It differs somewhat from the
standard stated in § 174 of the Restatement of
Trusts, Second, which is as follows
The trustee is under a dutv to the benefi,
.
., . " . .
ciarv in administering the trust to exercise
such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property, and if the trustee has or procures his
appointment as trustee by representing that he
has greater skill than that of a reasonable man

of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exerase such skill"
By making the basic standard align to that
observed by a prudent man m dealing with the
property of another, the section accepts a stan^ard as it has been articulated in some deciS 1 0 n s r e g arding the duty of a trustee concernSee Estate of Cook (Del.
mV estments
Chanc
193
2Q ^
Ch
123 m
A
?30
*u J *
J
L J U X U
U
vl
Also,
the duty as described by the above sec/ .
/ , , . , .
^ l0 » m o r e c l e a r l >' c o n v * J s t h * l d e a , t h a * a
**** ^ u s t «>*& ™ t h a " external, rather
than wlth a
personal, standard of care.
Cross-References. — Public Transit Dist n c t Act
> investments, § 17A-2-1036

75-7-303. Duty to inform and account to beneficiaries.
(1) The trustee shall keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed
of the trust and its administration by informing in writing the current beneficiaries of the trustee's name and address withm 30 days after acceptance of
the trust.
(2) Upon reasonable request, the trustee shall provide the beneficiary with
a copy of the terms of the trust which describe or affect his interest and with
relevant information about the assets of the trust and the particulars relating
to the administration.
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(3) Upon reasonable request, a beneficiary is entitled to a statement of th
accounts of the trust annually and on termination of the trust or change of the
trustee.
(4) A current beneficiary is a beneficiary to whom the trustee may or shall
distribute either principal or income.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-303, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8; 1992, ch. 179, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, efTective July 1, 1992, rewrote Subsection (1), combining the former first and second
sentences; redesignated former Subsections
(1Kb) and (l)(c) as Subsections (2) and <3); and
added new Subsection (4).
Editorial Board Comment. — Analogous
provisions are found in § 3-705 [omitted in
Utah].
This provision does not require regular accounting to the court nor are copies of statements furnished beneficiaries required to be
filed with the court. The parties are expected to
assume the usual ownership responsibility for
their interests including their own record
keeping. Under § 75-1-108, the holder of a general power of appointment or of revocation can
negate the trustee's duties to any other person.
This section requires that a reasonable selection of beneficiaries is entitled to information
so that the interests of the future beneficiaries
may adequately be protected. After mandatory
notification of registration by the trustee to the
beneficiaries, further information may be ob-

tained by the beneficiary upon request. This is
to avoid extensive mandatory formal accounts
and yet provide the beneficiary with adequate
protection and sources of information. In most
instances, the trustee will provide beneficiaries
with copies of annual tax returns or tax statements that must be filed. Usual1 y this will be
accompanied by a narrative explanation by the
trustee. In the case of the charitable trust, notice need be given only to the attorney general
or other state officer supervising charitable
trusts and in the event that the charitable
trust has, as its primary beneficiary, a charitable corporation or institution, notice should be
given to that charitable corporation or institution. It is not contemplated that all of the individuals who may receive some benefit as a resuit of a charitable trust be informed,
Coordinating Clause. — Laws 1992, ch.
179, § 18 provides: "The amendments to Sections 75-3-801, 75-3-803, 75-3-806, 75-3-807,
75-3-1003, and 75-3-1006 shall apply only to
the estates of decedents who die on or after the
effective date of this act [July 1, 1992]. All
other amendments shall be effective for all estates upon the effective date of this act."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 405
et seq.
C.J.S. — 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 377 et seq.
A.L.R. — Duty of personal representative of

deceased trustee to render account, 36
A.L.R.3d 1071.
Key Numbers. — Trusts s=> 289 et seq.

75-7-304. Duty to provide bond.
A trustee need not provide bond to secure performance of his duties unless
required by the terms of the trust, reasonably requested by a beneficiary, or
found by the court to be necessary to protect the interests of the beneficiaries
who are not able to protect themselves and whose interests otherwise are not
adequately represented. On petition of the trustee or other interested person
the court may excuse a requirement of bond, reduce the amount of the bond,
release the surety, or permit the substitution of another bond with the same
or different sureties. If bond is required, it shall be filed in the court of the
county where the trust has its principal place of administration, or other
appropriate court in amounts and with sureties and liabilities as provided in
Sections 75-3-604 and 75-3-606 relating to bonds of personal representatives.
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75-7-305

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

History: C. 1953, 75-7-304, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8.
Editorial Board Comment — See
§§75-3-603 and 75-3-604: 60 Okla. Stats.
1961, S» 175.24 [60 Okl. St. Ann. § 175.24]; Pa.
Fid. Act, 1949. § 320.911(b) [see now 20
Purdon's Pa. Stat. § 7111(b)]; cf. Tenn. Code
Ann. i? 35-1-113.
This section and 7-102 [omitted in Utah]
are related. The latter section makes it clear
that registration may be released without

court order if the trustee and beneficiaries can
agree on the matter. Section 75-1-108 may be
relevant, also.
The primarv thrust of Chapter 7 is to relate
m ^ t administration to the jurisdiction of
courtSi r a t n e r

than

to deal

with

SUDStantive

matters

of trust law. An aspect of deviation,
however, is touched here.
Cross-References. - Personal representa-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts
& 427.

C.J.S. — 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 224.
Key Numbers. — Trusts «=> 161.

75-7-305- Trustee's duties — Appropriate place of administration — Deviation.
A trustee is under a continuing duty to administer the trust at a place
appropriate to the purposes of the trust and to its sound, efficient management. If the principal place of administration becomes inappropriate for any
reason, the court may enter any order furthering efficient administration and
the interests of beneficiaries, including, if appropriate, removal of the trustee
and appointment of a trustee in another state. Trust provisions relating to the
place of administration and to changes in the place of administration or of
trustee control unless compliance would be contrary to efficient administration or the purposes of the trust. Views of adult beneficiaries shall be given
weight in determining the suitability of the trustee and the place of administration.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-305, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts
& 323.

75-7-306. Personal liability of trustee to third parties.
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not personally
liable on contracts properly entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course
of administration of the trust estate unless he fails to reveal his representative capacity and identify the trust in the contract.
(2) A trustee is personally liable for obligations arising from ownership or
control of property of the trust estate or for torts committed in the course of
administration of the trust estate only if he is personally at fault.
(3) Claims based on contracts entered into by a trustee in his fiduciary
capacity, on obligations arising frorrl ownership or control of the trust estate,
or on torts committed in the course of trust administration may be asserted
against the trust estate by proceeding against the trustee in his fiduciary
capacity, whether or not the trustee is personally liable therefor.
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(4) The question of liability as between the trust estate and the trustee
individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or
indemnification or other appropriate proceeding.
(5) Whenever an instrument creating a trust reserves to the settlor, or
vests in an advisory or investment committee, or in any other person or persons, including one or more cotrustees to the exclusion of the trustee or to the
exclusion of one or more of several trustees, authority to direct the making or
retention of any investment, the excluded trustee or trustees shall not be
liable, either individually or as a fiduciary, for any loss resulting from the
making or retention of any investment pursuant to such direction.
(6) In the absence of actual knowledge or information which would cause a
reasonable trustee to inquire further, no trustee shall be liable for failure to
take necessary steps to compel the redress of any breach of trust or fiduciary
duty by any predecessor personal representative, trustee, or other fiduciary.
The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit the fiduciary
liability of any trustee for his own acts or omissions with respect to the trust
estate.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-306, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8; 1977, ch. 194, § 67; 1992,
ch. 179, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, deleted "estate"
after "identify the trust" near the end of Subsection (1) and made a stylistic change in Subsection (4).
Editorial Board Comment. — The purpose
of this section is to make the liability of the
trust and trustee the same as that of the decedent's estate and personal representative.
Ultimate liability as between the estate and
the fiduciary need not necessarily be determined whenever there is doubt about this
question. It should be permissible, and often it
will be preferable, for judgment to be entered,
for example, against the trustee individually
for purposes of determining the claimant's
rights without the trustee placing that matter
into controversy. The question of his right of
reimbursement may be settled informally with
beneficiaries or in a separate proceeding in the
probate court involving reimbursement. The
section does not preclude the possibility, however, that beneficiaries might be permitted to
intervene in litigation between the trustee and

a claimant and that all questions might be resolved in that action.
Final accounts terminating the trustee's obligations to the trust beneficiaries may be formal or informal. Formal judicial accountings
may be initiated by the petition of any trustee
or beneficiary. Informal accounts may be conclusive by consent or by limitation. This section provides a special limitation supporting
informal accounts. With regard to facilitating
distribution see § 75-5-102.
Section 75-1-108 makes approval of an informal account or settlement with a trustee by
the holder of a presently exercisable general
power of appointment binding on all beneficiaries. In addition, the equitable principles of estoppel and laches, as well as general statutes of
limitation, will apply in many cases to terminate trust liabilities.
Coordinating Clause. — Laws 1992, ch.
179, § 18 provides: "The amendments to Sections 75-3-801, 75-3-803, 75-3-806, 75-3-807,
75-3-1003, and 75-3-1006 shall apply only to
the estates of decedents who die on or after the
effective date of this act [July 1, 1992]. All
other amendments shall be effective for all estates upon the effective date of this act.''

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Trustee as executor.
Because the bank acted in a dual capacity as
trustee and executor, it clearly was aware of
any breach of duty it may have committed as
executor of an estate. This section does not ab-

solve a trustee who has knowledge of the unlawful conduct of a predecessor executor. Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 801 P.2d 144
(Utah 1990).
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(hi) periodically reviewing the agent's actions to monitor the
agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.
(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent has a duty to the trust
to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
(c) A trustee who complies with the requirements of Subsection (ll)(a)
is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for the decisions or actions
of the agent to whom the function was delegated.
(12) The following terms or comparable language in the provisions of a
trust, unless otherwise limited or modified, authorizes any investment or
strategy permitted under this section: "investments permissible by law for
investment of trust funds," "legal investments," "authorized investments,"
u
using the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing that
persons of prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the management
of their own affairs, not in regard to the speculation but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their fimds, considering the probable income as well
as the probable safety of their capital," "prudent man rule," "prudent trustee
rule," "prudent person rule," and "prudent investor rule."
(13) This section applies to trusts existing on and created after July 1, 1995.
As applied to trusts existing on July 1,1995, this section governs only decisions
or actions occurring after July 1, 1995.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-302, enacted by L.
1995, ch. 119, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1995, ch. 119, § 3 repeals former § 75-7-302, as
enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 8, defining a
trustee's standard of care and performance in

language similar to that in Subsection (1) of the
new version, and enacts the present section,
effective July 1, 1995.
Cross-References. — Conservator's duties
generally, § 75-5-417.

75-7-303. Duty to inform and account to beneficiaries.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Effect of § 75-1-108.
A beneficiary was not entitled to an accounting of a trust corpus by the trustee of a revocable trust in which the settlor had retained a
general power of appointment and had specifi-

cally negated the trustee's duties to account to
her children as beneficiaries. Montrone v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 875 P.2d 557 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

PART 4
UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS PROVISIONS
75-7-401. Powers of trustee conferred by trust or by law.
(1) The trustee has all powers conferred upon him by the provisions of this
part unless limited in the trust instrument.
(2) An instrument which is not a trust under Subsection 75-1-201(53) may
incorporate any section or subsection of this part by reference.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-401, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8; 1998, ch. 39, 5 102.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1998, substituted "Subsection 75-1-201(53)" for "Subsection 75-1201(45)" in Subsection (2).

75-7-402

75-7-402.

UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

98

Powers of trustees conferred by this part.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in Tavlor v. Hansen, 958 R2d 923
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).

75-7-403. Trustee's office not transferable — Transactions
excepted.
(1) The trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire
administration of the trust to a co-trustee or another.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any transaction permitted under Section
7-5-14 or Subsection 75-7-302(11)!
History: C. 1953, 75-7-403, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 8; 1986, ch. 1, § 36; 1995, ch.
119, 8 4.

Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendmerit, effective July 1, 1995, added "or Subsection 75-7-302(11)" to Subsection (2).

75-7-405. Powers exercisable by joint trustees — Liability.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in West v. West, 948 R2d 351 (Utah
1997).

75-7-409. Recitals when title to real property is in trust —
Failure.
(1) When title to real property is granted to a person as trustee, the terms
of the trust may be given either:
(a) in the deed of transfer; or
(b) in an instrument signed by the grantor and recorded in the same
office as the grant to the trustee.
(2) If the terms of the trust are not made public as required in Subsection
(1), a conveyance from the trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value
who take the property without notice of the terms of the trust.
(3) The terms of the trust recited in the deed of transfer or the instrument
recorded under Subsection (1Kb) shall include:
(a) the name of the trustee;
(b) the address of the trustee; and
(c) the name and date of the trust.
History: C. 1953, 75-7-409, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 14, § 2; 2000, ch. 320, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-

ment, effective Mav 1, 2000, added Subsection
(3).

75-7-410. Limitations on powers of a trust beneficiary to
make or obtain distributions to or for himself.
(1) Unless the terms of a trust refer specifically to this section and provide
expressly to the contrary, the powers conferred upon a person who is a
beneficiary of a trust, whether in his capacity as a trustee or as an individual
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JOHN W. BUCKLEY #4000
Attorney for Helen Linnea Bennett
364 West 3900 North
Provo, UT 84604
(801) 223-9595

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DWIGHT HUGHES, et. al.
Plaintiffs,

ORDER APPOINTING
INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT
FOR HUGHES FAMILY TRUST

vs.
EVAM. CAFFERTY, et. al.
Defendants.

Civil No. 96-0400289-PR
Judge Howard H. Maetani

A HEARING was held on Friday, October 25, 1996, at 9:45 a.m. to appoint an
independent certified public accountant to administer the day-to-dayfinancialtransactions of the
McClure Hughes Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust (the "Trust"), and to conduct an accounting
of the Trust assets. The parties were represented by their respective counsel, Matthew C. Barneck,
John W. Buckley, and Craig Carlile, who each made appropriate arguments to the Court regarding
their preferences in this matter. After hearing the arguments and reviewing the resumes and firm
brochures of the six (6) different CPAs whose names were submitted to the Court for consideration,
and good cause appearing therefor:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Paul N. Shields, CPA, of thefirmNEILSEN, ELGGREN, DURKIN & CO.,

certified public accountants and consultants, with ofiBces located on the third floor of American
Plaza One at 77 West 200 South in Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 (801 363-0700), be appointed and
retained by the Trust to (1) independently administer the day-to-day financial transactions of the
Trust, and (2) conduct an independent accounting of Trust assets. The existing managers of the
Trust properties shall continue to manage such properties and shall report to Paul N. Shields. Paul
N. Shields shall not be responsible for the day-to-day management of the Trust properties. The
engagement letter of Paul N. Shields attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
reference is hereby approved by the Court.
2.

All parties are directed to promptly turn over and deliver all applicable

documents and records to Paul N. Shields.
3.

All management or operating accounts and funds of the Trust (but not Trust

investment accounts), including but not limited to:
(a)

the McClure Hughes Family Inter Vivos Trust account
#70545068282 at the Roosevelt Bank in Chesterfield, Missouri, and

(b)

the McClure Hughes Family Trust account #3512070902 at the Mark
Twain Bank in St. Charles, Missouri

shall be promptly transferred to Paul N. Shields and Paul N. Shields shall be designated as an
authorized signatory on the accounts.

2

4.

Any bank orfinancialinstitution holding operating or management funds of

the Trust, including those described in paragraph 3. above are hereby ordered and directed to
designate Paul N. Shields as an authorized signatory on such accounts.
5.

Paul N. Shields is authorized and ordered to engage an MAI or other certified

appraiser to appraise the Trust's real property located in Los Angeles County, California and also
to obtain a preliminary title report with respect to such property.
6.

Paul N. Shields is authorized and ordered to engage a listing agent with

respect to the Los Angeles County, California property, excluding from such listing any of the
children (and their respective spouses) of McClure Hughes.
7.

Paul N. Shields is authorized and ordered to engage a certified residential

appraiser to appraise the Trust's real properties located in Utah County, Utah to the extent such
properties have not already been appraised and also to obtain a preliminary title report with respect
to such properties.
8.

Paul N. Shields is authorized and ordered to engage a listing agent with

respect to the Trust's Utah County, Utah properties to the extent such properties have not already
been listed with Total Property Management, excluding from such listing any of the children (and
their respective spouses) of McClure Hughes.

3

DATED this

day of November, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

^V^^M
MAETANI
APPROVED AS TOFORM:

V

Matthew C. Barneck
uau

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

126622
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EXHIBIT A
|

NEILSON
ELGGREN
1 DURKIN&CO.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS
\ND CONSULTANTS

LOS ANGELES
ORANGE COUNTY
PHOENIX

AMERICAN PLAZA ONE
77 WEST 200 SOUTH
THIRD FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

SALT LAKE CITY
801-363-0700
TELECOPIER
301-531-8113

1

SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE

1 VENTURA COUNTY

November 4, 1996

Craig Carlile, Esq.
Ray Quinney & Nebeker
92 N. University Avenue, #210
Provo, Utah 84601
John W. Buckley, Esq.
364 West 3900 North
Provo, Utah 84604
David Lauritzen, Esq.
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Dwight Hughes
1042 E. Fort Union, No. 116
Midvale, Utah 84047
RE:

Hughes Marital and Family Trusts

Dear Gentlemen:
We appreciate the opportunity to be of service to you in
regard to the above-referenced matter.
The primary scope of our services is to examine the
propriety of asset and liability transfers to and from the
McClure G. Hughes Marital Trust and the McClure G. Hughes Family
Trust. The time frame of the period of examination has not yet
been determined. We will determine the appropriate period of
examination after considering the relevant information.
It is our understanding that we are to employ Total Property
Management as property managers for the Twin Homes property
located in the State of Utah, Utah County. It is also our
understanding that the existing property management arrangements
will continue without modification. At this time, we do not
intend to perform an accounting of bank accounts controlled by
the property management companies that have managed the various
properties. If such an accounting is deemed necessary by the
parties in interest, we will perform such an accounting at the
direction of the Court.

Page 2
November 4, 1996
RE: Hughes Marital and Family Trusts
Finally, if requested by the Court, we will prepare and
submit a report that outlines the tasks and procedures performed,
and details our findings. We will also perform additional tasks,
if any, as directed by the Court.
Our fees will be based on the number of hours worked by our
professionals and staff multiplied by their respective hourly
rates plus out of pocket expenses. The hourly rates for 1996,
after applying a 20% discount, are as follows:
Partner
Manager
Staff Accountant
Para-Professional

$13 0
105
60
40

In order to further minimize costs, it is our policy to
direct the work to the lowest possible staff level thereby
reducing costs while maintaining control over the integrity of
our work product.
Our fees and attendant expenses shall be rendered to John
Buckley law firm to be paid monthly. We understand our fees will
be paid from the assets of the McClure G. Hughes Marital Trust
and the McClure G. Hughes Family Trust (the "Trusts"). Should
any of the parties wish to question any portion of our bill, we
would ask that you do so in a prompt manner in order for us to
resolve any difficulties and assure expeditious payment.
We reserve the right to suspend service if the payments are
not received. In the event a dispute arises between us in the
course of this engagement, it is agreed that mediation will be
used prior to binding arbitration pursuant to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Our opinions, of course, will
be determined independently and our full fee will be due
regardless of the opinion rendered or the outcome of this
litigation. Outside services beyond the scope as enumerated
within this engagement letter shall be approved by you in
advance. Such services shall be paid by us and reimbursed by you
unless other arrangements are made at the time the services are
approved.
Any information that we obtain in connection with work
completed pursuant to this agreement will be regarded by us, and
anyone assisting or employed by us, as confidential. We further
agree that we will not disclose any confidential information
received in the course of this engagement to any third party
except upon express authorization by you or unless directed to do
so by the Court. Our compliance with an order to testify or
produce documents would not be considered a breach of this

Page 3
November 4, 199 6
RE: Hughes Marital and Family Trusts
agreement. Moreover, in light of the foregoing and the necessity
of keeping the matter and results of our work confidential during
the pendency of this action, we will not publish any article
relating to or bearing upon the issues in the litigation except
with your consent.

.Todd
Partner
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LYNN J CLARK #4013
Attorney for Petitioner
935 East South Union Avenue
Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-7600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Tn Re*

McCLURE GUY HUGHES,
an Incapacitated Person.

)
)

ORDER OF GUARDIANSHIP
AND CONSERVATORSHIP

)
)

Probate No. 933400268

The Petition of Linnea Bennett, daughter of the above named incapacitated
person, came on for hearing before the above named Court on Friday the 15th day
of October at 8:00 a.m.
Present were the Petitioner Linnea Bennett, a daughter, represented by her
attorney Lynn J Clark, Eva (Rikki) Cafferty, a daughter, represented by her
attorney Richard H. Johnson II, as well as Dwight Hughes and John Hughes, sons
of the incapacitated person W'IO represented themselves. Also, present were the
incapacitated person, McCIure Guy Hughes, and his wife Leora Hughes
represented by Susan Griffith.

All of the interested persons met together and all but one, Dwight Hughes,
reached an agreement and stipulation that was read into the record by Lynn J
Clark. The Court poled the others present and all with the exception of Dwight
Hughes approved and consented to the Stipulation. That Stipulation as read into
the record, is as follows:
1.

Jurisdiction of all matters connected with the guardianship of Mr. McClure
Hughes and the conservatorship of his estate shall be exclusively held by the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah.

2.

The case for the conservatorship of the person of McClure Guy Hughes and
the conservatorship of his estate now pending in California will be dismissed
and any orders which have now been issued or which will be issued in that
case shall be considered null and void due to that Court's lack of jurisdiction
and the parties' agreement.

3.

McClure Guy Hughes is incompetent to provide for his own care or to
manage his estate.

4.

Guardianship of the person of McClure Guy Hughes shall be awarded jointly
to Leora Hughes, his wife, and Joseph McClure Hughes, a son.

5.

Conservatorship of the estate of McClure Guy Hughes shall be awarded to
his wife, Leora Hughes, for so long as she is either willing or able to so
serve. At such time as she becomes unable to serve or until she shall resign
from that position, then Linnea Hughes Bennett, a daughter of McClure Guy

Hughes shall automatically assume the position of Conservator of the estate
of Mr. McClure Guy Hughes. Both shall serve without bond.
6.

Mr. Joseph Hughes and Eva Cafferty, Trustees of the McClure Guy Hughes
Family Trust and Marital Trust, shall prepare a detailed accounting of the
trust assets, income and expenses for the last three (3) years beginning with
January 1, 1990, and provide that accounting to all of the other family
members within a reasonable time.

7.

The Trustees shall prepare full accountings of the trusts on at least an annual
basis with modified accountings reflecting assets, receipts and disbursements
of both of the trusts on a mid-year basis or more often as the trust may
require. Such accountings shall be made provided to all family members.
The full year end accountings shall be prepared by or reviewed by an
accounting professional to assure their correctness.

8.

The Trustees shall enlist the aid of a professional in accounting and
operating the trust to ensure that all accounting and reporting is done and
that all tax matters and distributions are properly managed.
Mr. Dwight Hughes addressed the Court with his concerns concerning the

appointment of Leora Hughes being appointed to act as the Conservator of the
estate. Mr. Johnson pointed out that under the State statute, Leora Hughes as the
wife of McClure Guy Hughes has first priority to serve in the capacity as
Conservator of Mr. Hughes' estate. Mr. Johnson requested that the Court resolve

the objection raised by Mr. Dwight Hughes by the Court giving deference to the
Will of the majority and the statute.
The Court found that:
1.

Jurisdiction was properly established in this Court as the residence of Mr.
McClure Guy Hughes is within this Court's jurisdictional boundaries.
Further that the Family Trust and the McClure Hughes Marital Trust,
created under the McClure Hughes Family Inter Vivos Trust Agreement, are
governed under Utah law.

2.

McClure Guy Hughes in an incapacitated person under the terms of Section
75-5-1 et seq. of the Ulan Uniform Probate Code.

3.

Leora Hughes is the wife of McClure Guy Hughes and is competent to serve
as the Co-Guardian of McClure Guy Hughes together with Joseph Hughes
who is a fit and proper person to assume the full role of Guardian in the
event of Leora Hughes' death or incapacity.

4.

Leora Hughes as the wife of McCIuie Guy Hughes is not only a fit and
proper person to be appointed as the Conservator of the estate of McClure
Guy Hughes, but that she has a statutory priority to act in that position and
that Linnea Bennett is a fit and proper person to be appointed to act as the
Successor Conservator of the estate of McClure Guy Hughes at the death or
incapacity or resignation of Leora Hughes.

The above stated agre ^merits and stipulations concerning the trust are fair
and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, havim; entered it's findings, the Court enters the following
it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:
McClure Guy Hughes is incapacitated/incompetent and requires the
appointment of a guardian for his person and a conservator for his estate.
Leora Hughes, as Co-Guardian and Conservator of the estate of McClure
Guy Hughes, has as of October 15, 1993, revoked all Powers of Attorney
issued by McClure Guy Hughes.

This action by the Conservator is

approved and adopted by the Court.
This Court shall have the sole jurisdiction over the matters of guardianship
and conservatorship for the person and the estate of McClure Guy Hughes.
The case in California concerning the conservatorship of the estate and
person of McClure Guy Hughes shall be dismissed and the orders of that
Court held invalid.
Leora Hughes and Joseph Hughes are hereby appointed to act as the CoGuardians of the person of McClure Guy Hughes, with Joseph to
automatically act as sole Guardian in the event of the death, incapacity or
resignation of Leora Hughes.

Leora Hughes is hereby appointed to act as the Conservator of the estate of
McClure Guy Hughes with Linnea H. Bennett to act as Successor
Conservator in the event that Leora Hughes resigns her position, becomes
incapacitated, or predeceases McClure Guy Hughes.
Joseph Hughes and Eva Cafferty, as Trustees, are ordered to prepare and
provide a detailed accounting for the past three (3) years beginning with
January 1st of 1990 for both of the trusts under their control and to provide
copies of that accounting to each of the other family members by April 15,
1994. Such accountings shall be prepared by or reviewed by an accounting
professional to insure their correctness.
The Trustees are ordered to prepare future trust accountings in accordance
with standard accounting procedures and to provide the same to all other
family members on
a.

an annual basis beginning with calendar year 1993 for the detailed and
complete accountings not later than the 30th of April the following
year;

b.

a mid-year (or more frequent basis as may be required under the
terms of the trust) accounting of the trusts assets, receipts and
disbursements.

The mid-year accounting will be provided to all

family members by August 31st of each year; and

c.

Such accountings shall be prepared by or reviewed by an accounting
professional to irsure their correctness.

The above Order is entered over the objection of Mr. Dwight Hughes based
on the controlling statute. This Order was also entered without respect to Exhibit
"A" attached to the original Petition.
DATED this _/<£_ day of
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BY THE COURT

ICTCOURT JUDGE
Approved as to For:
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[CHARD H. JO
Attorney for JosejmyHughesy.aind?:
Eva Cafferty
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